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INTRODUCTION

When noted art dealer and collector Ileana Sonnabend died in 2007
at the age of 92, her estate included works of art valued at more than
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$800 million.' Robert Rauschenberg's 1959 Canyon was one of them. 2
Canyon is a Rauschenberg "combine"-a three dimensional wall-hung
work of art incorporating distinctive and uncommon found items with
painting and other mediums. 3 In Canyon, an actual taxidermied bald
eagle with its wings fully extended juts outward from the bottom of the
canvas. For the art world, combines are among Rauschenberg's most
important works, but for Sonnabend's estate and the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), Canyon raises important questions for federal estate tax
purposes.
Property included in a decedent's estate is valued for estate tax
purposes at its fair market value as of the date of death, 4 with the
relevant market being "that in which such item is most commonly sold
to the public."5 Selling Canyon, however, would be a federal crime,
subjecting the seller and buyer to jail and fines because sales of bald
eagles or their parts, whether dead or alive, are in violation of the Bald
and Golden Eagle Protection Act. 6 That is why, based on three separate
independent appraisals, the estate valued Canyon on its estate tax return
at $0.7 The IRS, however, has reportedly valued Canyon at $65 million
and issued a deficiency notice claiming $29.2 million in taxes and $11.7

1Patricia Cohen, Art's Sale

Value? Zero. The Tax Bill? $29 Million, N.Y. TIMES July 22, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/arts/design/a-catch-22-of-art-and-taxes-starring-a-stuffedeagle.html?pagewanted=all; Eileen Kinsella, Rauschenberg Eagle Ruffles Feathers, ARTNEWS,
May 1, 2012, http://www.artnews.con2012/05/01/rauschenberg-eagle-ruffles-feathers/; Janet
Novack, Even Rich Heirs Deserve a Fair Shake From the IRS, FORBES, Feb. 23, 2012,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/2012/02/23/even-rich-heirs-deserve-a-fair-shake-fromthe-irs/.
2 Robert Rauschenberg (1925-2008), an American artist, was highly influential in the
development of many of the movements in mid-to-late twentieth century art.
Rauschenberg's legacy begins with the combines .. .Artists who change the way other
artists look at art-that happens very infrequently. Pop art, Fluxus, Arte Povera, the
performance art of the sixties, conceptualism in the seventies, environmental art,
installation art, political art-all that erasure between the art object and the person who
made it began with the combines.
Calvin Tomkins, Everything in Sight: Robert Rauschenberg'sNew Life, NEW YORKER, May 23,
2005, http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/05/23/050523fa-facttomkins (quoting Paul
Schimmel, then chief curator for Museum of Contemporary Art in Los Angeles).
3 "Combine" is a term used by Rauschenberg for many of the works that he created between 1954
and 1964.
See Mark Stevens, Collage Education, N.Y. MAGAZINE, Dec. 18, 2005,
http://nymag.com/nymetro/arts/art/reviews/15332/. "He'd put anything in art: ... even stuffed
animals. Especially stuffed animals." Contemporary artists (famous and otherwise) continue
their fascination with animals. British artist Damien Hirst is well-known for his conceptual piece,
The Physical Impossibility ofDeath in the Mind of Someone Living, which is a shark floating in a
tank of formaldehyde. On the other hand, lesser-known Miami artist Enrique Gomez de Molina
is now serving a twenty-month sentence in federal prison for smuggling endangered species into
the U.S. His art consists of combining taxidermy parts of different exotic animals to create
"hauntingly beautiful hybrid creatures." Lydia Martin, From Toast of the Art World to Guest of
Federal Pen, MIAMI HERALD, May 20, 2012, http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/05/19/
2808170_p2/how-an-artists-pursuit-of-originality.html.
4 I.R.C. §2031 (2006).
5 Treas. Reg. §20.2031-1 (2012).
6 Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 87-884, 76 Stat. 1246 (1962). See
discussion infra Part I.A.
7 Cohen, supra note 1.
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million in penalties.8 While valuation disputes over works of art are
commonplace in tax matters, the Sonnabend scenario is more than a
routine valuation dispute. It shines a spotlight on the estate tax meaning
of fair market value, forces recognition of Canyon 's novel restricted
ownership status, and raises concerns about the valuation process for
works of art.
Part I will first examine how the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection
Act, as a regulatory restriction, impacts the concept of ownership. This
restricted ownership will then be viewed within the contours of Section
2033 of the Internal Revenue Code, the basic inclusion section for estate
tax purposes.9 Part II will delve into the fair market value standard for
Canyon. The fallacy of the parties' extreme positions-the IRS's red
herring of the illicit art market and the taxpayer's assertion of zero
value-will be addressed. Part III will consider the Canyon controversy
in the context of IRS protocols for art valuations, including the role of
the Art Advisory Panel and Art Appraisal Services. Part IV will
conclude with three recommendations. The first is that the relevant
market for estate tax purposes should not include the illicit market
absent a decedent's prior activities or intent to enter that market.
Second, if works of art are subject to regulatory restrictions, those
restrictions should be fully disclosed on the estate tax return, along with
a positive statement indicating the extent of the decedent's ownership
interest. Third, the protocols for IRS art valuations should be fully
examined to ensure competency, objectivity, and transparency of
process.
I.

IMPACT OF THE BALD AND GOLDEN EAGLE PROTECTION ACT ON
OWNERSHIP RIGHTS IN CANYON

A. Bald and Golden Eagle ProtectionAct
In 1940, the Bald Eagle Protection Act was passed to protect the
bald eagle, the nation's symbol, from extinction.' 0 This Act provided
8 Kinsella, supra note 1. There is no official IRS statement regarding this controversy;
consequently, all assertions of facts are as presented by the Estate. Interestingly, in a post to the
Novack blog, Joseph Bothwell wrote "[t]his was an interesting problem. While not addressing it
directly, let me point out a few issues." Joseph Bothwell, Comment to Novack, supra note 1. He
then proceeds to mention Robson v. Commissioner (see infra note 88), United States v. Meador
(see infra note 70), and the possibility of a later charitable deduction (discussed infra note 120).
Joseph Bothwell was the chair of the IRS Art Advisory Panel during the relevant time and is now
retired from the IRS. I assume that the Joseph Bothwell who posted the comment is the same
person as the former IRS employee.
9 I.R.C. § 2033 (2006).
10Bald Eagle Protection Act, ch. 278, 54 Stat. 250 (1940); see Roberto Iraola, The Bald and
Golden Eagle ProtectionAct, 68 ALB. L. REv. 973 (2005) for a thorough discussion of the Act.
There are other related federal statutes that may also be of concern. See, e.g., the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2006). At one time the bald eagle was protected under the
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43, but it has since been delisted. See Removing the
Bald Eagle in the Lower 48 States from the List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 72 Fed.
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for a maximum criminal penalty of $500, six months imprisonment, or
both for anyone who shall "take, possess, sell, purchase, barter, offer to
sell, purchase or barter, transport, export or import . . . any bald
eagle . .. alive or dead, or any part, nest or egg thereof"." There was a
limited exemption for bald eagles taken before enactment: "nothing
herein shall be construed to prohibit possession or transportation of any
such eagle . . . lawfully taken prior to the effective date of this Act [June

8, 1940] . . . ."12
The Act has been amended three times since 1962. First, in 1962,
the Act was amended to provide protection for golden eagles, with the
Act becoming popularly known as the Bald and Golden Eagle
Protection Act (BGEPA).1 3 Ten years later, BGEPA was further
amended, in four primary ways.14 First, the mens rea necessary for the
criminal offense was amended from "willfully" to "knowingly, or with
wanton disregard for the consequences" of the act.' 5 Second, the
criminal penalties were increased to $5,000 and one year imprisonment,
with an increase to $10,000 and two years imprisonment for a repeat
offender.' 6 These amounts were increased significantly by the Criminal
Fines and Improvement Act of 1987 ($100,000 and $250,000 for an
individual with a misdemeanor and a felony conviction, respectively,
and $200,000 and $500,000, respectively, for an organization). '7 Third,
a new civil penalty of $5,000 was added for those who, without
authority, do any of the above described acts or who violate any permit
or regulation.' 8 Fourth, the taking, possession or transporting of golden

Reg. 37346 (July 9, 2007). "The ESA provides the broadest protection for eagles and their
habitat of any conservation law. The ESA provides a federal agency consultation requirement,
habitat protections, and a citizen suit provision that neither BGEPA nor the MBTA contain.
Because delisting takes these important protections away, ... BGEPA and the MBTA will be
even more important to the survival of bald eagles . . . ." Arnie Jamieson, Will Bald Eagles
Remain Compelling Enough to Validate the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act After ESA
Delisting? The Ninth Circuit'sAnalysis in United States v. Antoine, 34 ENVTL. L. 929, 941

(2004). For purposes of this essay, only the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act will be
considered.
It 54 Stat. 250. The term "take" was defined to include "pursue, shoot, shoot at, wound, kill,
capture, trap, collect, or otherwise willfully molest or disturb." Id.
12Id. There was also an exception for "the Territory of Alaska." Id.
13Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 87-884, 76 Stat. 1246 (1962) [hereinafter
BGEPA]. The 1962 amendment also provided an exception for the taking of golden eagles to
protect livestock and provided the Secretary of the Interior the regulatory power to exempt
takings "for the religious purposes of Indian tribes." Id. There has been a robust discussion about
BGEPA's impact on the First Amendment rights of members of Indian tribes. See Iraola, supra
note 10, at 977-84 for general case discussion.
14Act of Oct. 23, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-535, 86 Stat. 1064; see generally Iraola,supra note 10, at
975-77.
15The change was intended "to lessen the degree of knowledge required to be proven in order to
convict violators." S. REP. No. 92-1159, at 5 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4285,
4289.
16BGEPA, supra note 13.
1718 U.S.C. § 3571 (b)-(c) (2006).
's

See 86 Stat. 1064.
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eagles for falconry in certain areas was permitted.19 Finally in 1978,
BGEPA was amended to authorize "the taking of golden eagle nests
which interfere with resource development or recovery operations." 20
The legislative equivocation on golden eagles stands in sharp
contrast to the clear and steady message of protection for bald eagles
found in BGEPA and its amendments. That legislative message,
however, was not effectively communicated to the population at large.
B. Rauschenberg's Creation,and Sonnabend'sAcquisition, of Canyon

Canyon is one of Rauschenberg's most famous works 21 and was
created by him in 1959, clearly after the 1940 passage of the Bald Eagle
Protection Act. According to a statement signed by Rauschenberg in
1998 for the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the bald eagle was
acquired from the wild and taxidermied prior to 1940.22 Rauschenberg
acquired the eagle in 1959 from a fellow artist, who herself retrieved it
from the trash of a recently-deceased elderly neighbor. As a found
object, this bald eagle fit within Rauschenberg's artistic vision of the
time, and as a pre-1940 bald eagle, Rauschenberg's acquisition was
most likely not in violation of BGEPA. 23 Nor did his use of the bald
eagle in his art present a legal issue for him. The subsequent transfer of
Canyon to Ileana Sonnabend in 1959 may have been a different matter.
While news accounts differ as to how and from whom Sonnabend
acquired Canyon in 1959,24 the dividing line between a violation of
BGEPA and its exception for pre-1940 bald eagles is the nature of the
acquisition. If it was a commercial transaction-a sale, for example,
that would be a violation of BGEPA-but a gift, on the other hand,
would not. Of all the acts prohibited by BGEPA, there was a narrow
exception for the possession or transporting of pre-enactment bald
eagles or their parts. 25 In Andrus v. Allard,26 the Supreme Court held
1916 U.S.C. §668(a) (2006).
20 Fish and Wildlife Improvement Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-616, §9, 92 Stat. 3114.
21See, e.g., Kinsella, supra note 1 ("The dispute centers on Robert Rauschenberg's seminal 1959
'combine' work Canyon . . .. ); see also Tomkins, supra note 2 ("I can't think of an image that
has more power than 'Canyon,' Jeff Koons, an artist who freely acknowledges his debt to
Rauschenberg, said recently.").
22See Kinsella, supra note 1 ("[H]e recounted that an artist Sari Dienes lived in the building
above Carnegie Hall . . . during the 1950s. Among the other tenants was a member of Teddy
Roosevelt's Rough Riders. . . . The man, who was not named, 'acquired from the wild, a bald
eagle, which he had taxidermied prior to 1940,' the statement said. After the man died in 1959,
Dienes retrieved the eagle from the trash and offered it to Rauschenberg.").
231 equivocate here for two reasons. First I am assuming that Rauschenberg received the bald
eagle gratuitously from his fellow artist. See discussion infra Part ID. Second, I am also
assuming that the retrieval of a pre-1940 bald eagle from the trash is not a taking. See Bald Eagle
Protection Act, supra note 10.
24Some reports say Sonnabend "bought 'Canyon' ... from Castelli." Novack, supra note 1.
Others say she acquired it "from a show at the gallery of her former husband, Leo Castelli."
Kinsella, supra note 1.
2516 U.S.C. § 668(a) (2006); see supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
26 444 U.S. 51 (1979); see discussion infra Part I.D.
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that Congress intended to prohibit all commercial activities involving
bald eagles, regardless of whether those eagles were taken pre- or postenactment.
Consequently, if Sonnabend bought the work from
Rauschenberg or from her former husband's gallery, it would have been
a sale in violation of BGEPA. Conversely, if Canyon was a gift to
Sonnabend directly from the artist Rauschenberg, all would be well. 27
C. Sonnabend's Ownership and Use of Canyon
Canyon was reportedly part of Sonnabend's personal art
collection, and she rarely parted with the works she chose for herself.28
Consequently, a sale of Canyon by Sonnabend was unlikely. She did,
however, regularly lend her personal works to museums and for
exhibitions here and abroad. It was as a result of the 1981 return of
Canyon from a European exhibition tour that federal FWS agents first
became aware of the combine Canyon.29 In turn, FWS notified
Sonnabend of the restrictions imposed on the work by BGEPA. A
special permit was applied for, and later issued to, Sonnabend that
allowed her to retain possession of the work. 30 It was noted that the
work could not be sold here or abroad, its whereabouts had to be made
known to the authorities, and if the work were to travel abroad for an
exhibit, Sonnabend would need to apply for a special export permit.3 '
With this issue seemingly resolved, Canyon was lent to the Baltimore
Museum of Art from 1982 until 2003, although Canyon would
sometimes be lent to other museums or exhibitions in accordance with
the outlined procedures. In preparing for one such foreign loan in 1998,
a request for the special export permit was denied because of a new
belief that the 1981 permit had been erroneously issued. 32 More
importantly, the FWS was considering revoking the 1981 permit. 33 It
27 Another possibility is two successive gift transfers, i.e., Rauschenberg gave Canyon to Castelli,

who then subsequently gave it to Sonnabend. As a practical matter, the 1959 transfers were
presumably not done "willfully" as then required for a violation. See supra text accompanying
notes 15-16.
28Novack, supra note 1.
29 Kinsella, supra note 1.
30 Pursuant to BGEPA § 668a, one may apply for a permit to allow the "taking, possession, and
transportation" of eagles for "scientific or exhibition purposes of public museums . . . or for the
religious purposes of Indian tribes." According to regulations issued by the Secretary of the
Interior, "we may . .. issue a permit authorizing the taking, possession, and transportation
[domestically or foreign] of lawfully acquired bald eagles." 50 C.F.R. §22.21 (2012). Compare
BGEPA's exception on pre-1940 taken eagles ("that nothing herein shall be construed to
prohibit" the possession and transportation of pre-enactment eagles) with the regulations
requiring a permit for possession of lawfully possessed eagles, which seems limited to the
purpose of exhibition. See infra text accompanying notes 47-54 regarding the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the property rights of an owner of a pre-enactment eagle.
31See 50 C.F.R. §22.21 (2012). The application for foreign travel would also need to comply
with the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. See
50 C.F.R. §23 (2012).
32Kinsella, supra note 1.
33Id. Under BGEPA, a violation can result in forfeiture of the eagle to the United States. 16
U.S.C. § 668b(b) (2006). Forfeiture raises many interesting and quite practical questions. An
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was the submission of Rauschenberg's written statement that the bald
eagle had been taken before 1940 that allowed Sonnabend to retain
Canyon's ownership, albeit as restricted by BGEPA. 34 Since the time of
her death in 2007, no serious question has apparently been raised as to
Sonnabend's ownership of Canyon; the questions have focused on its
valuation for estate tax purposes.
D. Canyon's Inclusion in Sonnabend's Gross Estate
Section 2033 of the Internal Revenue Code is the basic inclusion
section for the federal estate tax. 35 It provides that "[t]he value of the
gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of the
interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death." 36 The language
of this section is decidedly general, and there is no doubt that
Sonnabend's ownership of Canyon, however restricted, is a section
2033 interest requiring inclusion. Yet the language commands that
value is "to the extent of the interest," underscoring that property can
have multiple interests, not all of which are held by the decedent, and
that value can thereby be affected.37 What is Sonnabend's interest in
Canyon for purposes of the federal estate tax? To answer that question,
one must first address another question. What ownership interest or
interests in Canyon did Sonnabend have or retain at the time of her
death because of BGEPA?
With its listing of prohibited acts and its exception for the
"possession or transportation" of pre-1940 bald eagles or parts, BGEPA
is the starting point in determining the ownership restrictions placed on
Canyon.38 The protective thrust of BGEPA for bald eagles is clear, but
initial question is whether only the bald eagle would be forfeited or whether Canyon would be
forfeited. The removal of the eagle from Canyon would destroy Rauschenberg's artistic work and
could raise serious intellectual property and copyright questions. The safer route is to forfeit
Canyon, but what would the U.S. do with it?
The normal procedure for dead eagles in the government's possession is to place the eagle
in the National Eagle Repository, the FWS's collection point in Denver for dead eagles. After its
condition is noted, "[t]he bird is then stored in a freezer until it is ready to be shipped" to a
member of an Indian tribe who has made an application for an eagle for "religious purposes."
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, How Can I Obtain Eagle Feathers or Parts?, http://www.fws.
gov/news/featherfaq.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2012). There is a backlog of such requests. See
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, National Eagle Repository, http://www.fws.gov/le/nationaleagle-repository.html (last updated Aug. 15, 2012). This process seems inappropriate and
assumedly unlikely for Canyon. Rauschenberg's work would probably be placed in a museum,
as it is now. The question may be who gets to control Canyon's museum location. See infra text
accompanying notes 124-25. There is another aspect that deserves mention: it is a reality of the
political process. Canyon is currently subject to BGEPA, but laws can be changed, or special
legislation could be enacted exempting Canyon. The publicity surrounding Canyon may be the
impetus to free Canyon from BGEPA in the future. See discussion infra Part II.B. of the impact
this possibility could have on value.
34 Kinsella, supra note 1.
35I.R.C. § 2033 (2006).

36 Id. (emphasis added).
37 I.R.C.

§ 2033

(2006).

38See supra notes 10-21 and accompanying text.
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interpretive questions have been raised as to the scope of the exception
for pre-enactment bald eagles. In 1979, the Supreme Court upheld an
expansive interpretation of BGEPA's commercial ban in Andrus v.

Allard.39

Allard, an enrolled member of the Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes, and others had been engaged for a period of time in
the trade of Native American artifacts. 40 Many of the items they sold
were partially composed of eagle parts that were from pre-enactment
eagles. 41 When they were convicted and fined for those sales, they
challenged the validity of the regulations issued by the Secretary of the
Interior that banned commerce in all eagle parts, regardless of when the
eagle had been taken. 42 Allard also alleged that if the regulations were
deemed valid, they were a violation of the Fifth Amendment takings
clause. 43 The three-judge District Court agreed with the plaintiffs." On
appeal to the Supreme Court, the decision was reversed on both
claims. 45
First, the Court upheld the regulations banning all commerce in
eagle parts as being fully consistent with the statutory language. 46 The
statutory listing of prohibitions was characterized as "sweepingly
framed" and as an "exhaustive and careful enumeration," while the
exception for the possession or transporting of pre-enactment eagle
parts was "narrow." 47 This precision in language was deemed
intentional and fully consistent with the legislative history. Moreover,
the ban on all commerce in eagle parts was "fully consonant with the
purposes" of BGEPA. 48 Because of the difficulty in determining the
age of eagle feathers, Congress could impose a total ban on commerce
rather than risk evasion (and consequent loss of protection) through an
exception for pre-enactment eagle parts.
Second, and more directly related to Canyon, the Court declined to
hold this regulatory ban on commerce, which it described as a "simple
prohibition" of sale, 49 as a taking requiring just compensation under the
Fifth Amendment.
The regulations challenged here do not compel the surrender of the
artifacts, and there is no physical invasion or restraint upon them.
Rather, a significant restriction has been imposed on one means of
39

Andrus, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
40 Id. at 54.
41 Id
42 Id. at 54-55.
43 Id
44 Id.
45 Id. at 68.
46 Id at 60-64.
47 Id. at 56.
48 Id. at 58.
49 Id. at 67.
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disposing of the artifacts. But the denial of one traditional property
right does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner
possesses a full "bundle" of property rights, the destruction of one
"strand" of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be
viewed in its entirety. In this case, it is crucial that appellees retain
the rights to possess and transport their property, and to donate or
devise the protected birds.50
This last sentence is important for three reasons. First, it informs
us of four rights-possess, transport, donate, and devise-that an owner
of a pre-enactment eagle retains. Second, in doing so, it emphasizes
that rights or interests in property is a concept much larger than the
statutory and regulatory listing of prohibitions and exceptions. Owning
property gives the owner certain rights that have developed over
centuries, even though the parameters of those rights defy precision,
precisely because property and rights in property evolve over time.51
Third, the Court confirms for the defendants that the eagle parts remain
"their property," and labels the retention of these four rights as "crucial"
to its determination that there was no taking for Fifth Amendment
purposes.
The Supreme Court's use of the bundle of rights metaphor to
analyze the takings issue is instructive. 52 Under the general bundle of
rights approach, owning property includes the right to exclusive use, the
right to income, the right to transfer in whole or in part during lifetime,
and the right to transfer at death.53 Set within this analytical framework,
the Court viewed the regulatory ban on commerce as a "significant
restriction . . . on one means of disposing of" property. 54 The Court

followed up by noting that, even though the ban forecloses the "most
profitable use" of the property, "it [was] not clear that appellees [would]
be unable to derive economic benefit from the artifacts; for example,
they might exhibit the artifacts for an admissions charge." 55 The rights
to income and to transfer during lifetime are compromised by the ban
50 Id. at 65-66 (citations omitted).
51See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163 (1999).

"Where does this leave Andrus? Three Justices concurred in Hodel solely to say Andrus is still
good law and to limit Hodel to its facts; another three Justices concurred solely to state the
opposite and limit Andrus to its facts. There the matter lies." Id. at 1216 (footnotes omitted).
52But see Garrett Power, Regulatory Takings: A Chronicle of the Construction of a

Constitutional Concept, 23 BYU J.PUB. L. 221, 239 (2009) ("use of [this] metaphor proved more
obfuscatory than explanatory.").
53Id. at 239.
54 Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65.
55Id. at 66. The Court did not explain why it minimized the right to income. See Power, supra

note 52, at 241. While the Court's statement about charging admission to view the artifacts
sounds a bit off, it may not be completely off the mark in the context of Canyon. For example, if
the copyright is also part of Canyon's ownership, licensing Canyon's image could provide an
income interest. Similarly, loans of art works to a museum are not necessarily wholly gratuitous.
It is reported that the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York currently provides insurance
coverage-of an undisclosed amount-for Canyon. Cohen, supra note 1.
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but are not wholly destroyed or taken. Consequently, there is no taking
for Fifth Amendment purposes. The right to exclusive use and the right
to transfer at death appear to be unaffected by BGEPA's "simple
prohibition of sale." 56
Andrus has generated withering criticism in the takings literature,57
and has been unsuccessfully challenged in court as being inconsistent
with more modem theories on takings.58 Nevertheless, as the only
Supreme Court case to address the retained property rights of an owner
of a pre-enactment eagle, it is an important case to understand "the
extent of the interest" for estate tax purposes.
II. FAIR MARKET VALUE OF CANYON FOR ESTATE TAx PURPOSES

Inclusion of an asset in the gross estate is the first step in
determining a decedent's federal estate tax liability; valuing the asset is
the necessary second step. The valuation standard for estate tax
purposes is fair market value, defined as "the price at which the
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing
seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both
having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts." 59 Fair market value as
the valuation standard is nearly as old as the estate tax. 60 The
Sonnabend scenario raises basic questions about fair market value,
including determining the relevant market in which to value.
The relevant market is the one in which the item "is most
commonly sold to the public, taking into account the location of the

56Regulations concerning permits for Indian religious purposes confirm inheritability or
descendability, stating that eagles possessed under those permits "are not transferable, except
such birds ... may be handed down from generation to generation or from one Indian to another
in accordance with tribal or religious customs." 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(b)(1) (2012). The division of
a decedent's tangible personal property among a decedent's beneficiaries can sometimes look like
a bartering transaction, as, for example, when the decedent's children divide the tangible personal
property among themselves in shares of substantially equal value. Presumably, this normal estate
administration process would not be considered a "purchase, barter, offer to sell, purchase or
barter" under BGEPA. See infra text accompanying note 125 for a concern regarding right to
exclusive use and possession.
57See, e.g., James Gordley, Takings, 82 TuL. L. REV. 1505, 1509 (2008) ("In Andrus v. Allard,
the Court upheld environmental regulations intended to prevent the killing of eagles by
prohibiting the sale of artifacts made with eagle parts. The majority claimed that collectors of
Native American artifacts containing eagle feathers had not lost all economic value of their
property because, conceivably, they could exhibit it to the public and charge a fee. That argument
borders on the mendacious.").
Professor Power labels Andrus as "problematic" and "some would say-unprincipled and
unfair." Power, supra note 52, at 240.
58In United States v. Kornwolf, 276 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 2002), the defendant sold an inherited
eagle headdress to an undercover agent. The defendant argued that recent takings cases
demonstrated "a greater solicitude to the burdens placed on property owners by governmental
regulations and less willingness to assume a justifying nexus between those burdens and public
purpose." Id. The Eighth Circuit held that Andrus was controlling and the court declined to
overturn a Supreme Court case directly on point. Id.
5916 C.F.R. § 20.2031-1(b) (2012).
60United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 549, 551-52 (1973).
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item wherever appropriate." 61 The determination of the relevant market
is a question of fact. For some assets, the relevant market may be a
hypothetical market. 62 Tax valuation cases consider the auction market
and the dealer-gallery market as the primary choices for art valuations
and, within that binary system, there are nuances. For example, is the
gallery market the high end, tourist, or museum gift shop? Foreign or
domestic? 63 For original unique works by known established artists, the
auction market is commonly used in valuation controversies in large
measure because of the availability of public sales records. Dealers
have no obligation to release actual sales prices from private sales, and,
to the contrary, may have contractual confidentiality agreements. 64
It is clear that with Canyon, the parties have taken extreme
positions on value, 65 neither of which is fully supportable under tax law
or policy. Those extreme positions may be based on different
understandings of the relevant market. The Service's extreme position
may be based upon valuing in an illicit market, while the estate's
extreme position may rest upon rejecting the use of a hypothetical
market.
A. Fallacyof the Illicit Market

Reports suggest that the IRS may have based its $65 million value
on a sale in the discreet or illicit market. 66 Despite some Treasury and
61 § 20.2031-1(b).

62 See discussion infra Parts IIA, II.B; see, e.g., Bank of Cal. v. Comm'r, 133 F.2d 428 (9th Cir.
1943) (holding that a claim for an income tax refund, which is a non-assignable chose in action,
had value even though it could not be sold). The court noted that the forerunner of § 2033
includes "all" property, making no distinction between assignable and non-assignable property.
Id. at 433. "It is idle, therefore, to say that nonassignable property could not have any fair market
value." Id.
63 See, e.g., Perdue v. Comm'r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 845 (1991), which determined that for certain
coins recovered from a Spanish galleon sunk in 1622, the "glamour market" was more
appropriate than the numismatic market. Id. This was due to the romance factor of the
shipwreck.
64 See 1 RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS,

INVESTORS, DEALERS, AND ARTISTS 237 (3d ed. 2005), for a contractual confidentiality

provision in a private sales agreement. For a discussion on why confidential agreements appeal
to buyers and sellers, see ANNE-MARIE RHODES, ART LAW & TRANSACTIONS 28 (2011).

65 This is not an uncommon tactic for taxpayers or the IRS, as many judicial decisions seem to
split the difference. For example, in Estate of David Smith v. Comm'r, 57 T.C. 650 (1972), the
fair market value of 425 sculptures created by the decedent were at issue. At one point, the Estate
argued these works were valued at zero because they remained unsold at his death, and the IRS
argued they were valued at $5,256,918. Id. at 655. The parties had adjusted the values for
litigation-$714,000 for the taxpayer, and $4,284,000 for the I.R.S. Id. The court's "ultimate
determination of value will necessarily constitute a 'Solomon-like pronouncement"', and it was.
Id. At $2,700,000, it was virtually midway between the two extreme positions. 3 LERNER, supra,
note 64 at 1749.
As one commentator puts it: "It is not at all unusual for parties in a valuation case to do the
"valuation dance": where the "positions begin at substantial distances from one another, and then
... get closer as the case ages on its way to trial."
REAL ESTATE 830 (2nd T.M. (BNA) A-2 (2003)).

L. PAUL HOOD, VALUATION: GENERAL AND

66 Kinsella, supra note 1 ("Lerner [the Estate's attorney] says when he talked to ... the interim
head of the [IRS] Art Advisory Panel, 'he told me there could be a market for the work . . .. [A]
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case law precedent, there are policy reasons why using the illicit market
in this case should be rejected. 67
In Technical Advice Memoranda (TAM) 9152005,68 the Service
addressed the estate tax consequences of stolen property held by a
decedent for the first time. It determined that stolen art treasures were
to be included in the thief's estate and were to be valued in an illicit
market. According to the TAM, that market "includes the discreet retail
markets of the international network of traffickers in stolen art as well
as the legitimate retail art markets consisting of international auction
firms ... and legitimate art and antiques dealers." 69 This TAM is
generally considered to involve the estate of Joseph T. Meador, a World
War 11 veteran from Texas who stole works of art and cultural property,
most notably the medieval treasures from Quedlinburg, Germany. 70 He
died in 1980, leaving his estate to his brother and sister. 71 His estate
filed a Texas inheritance tax return that did not include the stolen
works. 72 After a few years, his brother and sister had the stolen objects
appraised. 73 In 1986, the siblings were told by an appraiser that the
medieval manuscript they had offered for appraisal was stolen.74
Nevertheless, they moved the manuscripts to Switzerland and continued
to offer them for sale. 75 In 1990, one was sold in Switzerland for $3
million. 76 By this time, Quedlinburg was able to trace the sale back to
Meador's estate in Texas and commenced legal action for recovery of
its treasure.77 Consequently, a decade after Meador's death, the IRS
became involved in his estate. At several places, the TAM noted that
the decedent had apparently sold works in this discreet market during
his lifetime,78 and following his death, his siblings also entered that
recluse billionaire in China might want to buy it and hide it.").
67For a thorough and critical analysis of the two TAMs discussed here, see William J. Turnier,

The Pink Panther Meets the Grim Reaper: Estate Taxation of the Fruits of Crime, 72 N.C. L.

REV. 163 (1993).
68 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-52-005 (Dec. 27, 1991).
69 Id.

70See Turnier, supra note 67, at 165-69; see also United States v. Meador, 138 F.3d 986 (5th
Cir. 1998); WILLIAM H. HONAN, TREASURE HUNT: A NEW YORK TIMES REPORTER TRACKS THE
QUEDLINBURG HOARD (1997).

71I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-52-005 (Dec. 27, 1991).
72 Id.

73 Id.
74 Id.
75

Id.

76 Id.

77 Id.
78Since the time of Meador's death in 1980, international cooperation in identifying stolen or

looted art and cultural property has become the ethical norm of the art industry. See, e.g.,
Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613 (2006). For
example, in the well-known case of Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v.
Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990), an American dealer offered
fourth century Byzantine mosaics to the Getty Museum in 1988. These mosaics had apparently
been taken from a Greek-Orthodox church in Cyprus when the area was under the control of a
Turkish invasionary force. The Getty "explained to the dealers that [the Getty] had a working
relationship with the Republic of Cyprus and that [the Getty] was duty-bound to contact Cypriot
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market.
Shortly after this TAM on stolen property, the IRS issued a TAM
concerning the estate taxation of illegal drugs. In TAM 9207004,79 the
decedent was a drug smuggler who died while attempting to land his
plane that was fully loaded with marijuana.80 Once at the crash site, the
police confiscated the 662.5 pounds of baled marijuana, which was later
destroyed.8 ' The IRS determined that the forfeited baled marijuana
should be included in the decedent's estate and its value should be the
"retail street value" of average grade marijuana sold in the Florida city
near the crash site. 82
Like many tax valuation disputes, neither of these two TAM
estates went to a judicial determination of value, and thus, the TAMs
are internal IRS interpretations untested by the judicial process. The
cases cited in the TAMs as support for using an illicit market for
valuation were income tax cases, not estate tax cases.
Most
significantly, these TAMs involved decedents who had knowingly and
voluntarily entered into an illicit market and who regularly sold there.
These two elements of voluntariness and regularity provided the
contextual support for using the illicit market for stolen art or illegal
drugs. Without those elements, however, the use of an illicit market for
legally owned, but restricted property violates judicially-voiced norms
of common sense and reasonableness.
In United States v. Cartwright,83 the Supreme Court struck a

Treasury Regulation mandating the use of the public offering market for
shares in a mutual fund for estate tax purposes. The Court called the
regulation "unrealistic and unreasonable," 84 while noting the taxpayer's
"argument has the clear ring of common sense." 85 The central difficulty
in the fair market value determination for Cartwright was that the
"shares once issued are not subject to disposition in a market of 'willing
buyers' and 'willing sellers.' 86 The Court invalidated the regulation,
noting that even if the regulation was not "technically inconsistent with

§ 2031 . .. , it is manifestly inconsistent with the most elementary
provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and operates
without regard for the market in mutual fund shares that the Act created
and regulates. Congress surely could not have intended § 2031 to be
officials about" the mosaics. Id. at 283. That contact led the Church to the defendant, from
whom it successfully recovered its looted treasure. Id. at 294.
79 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-07-004 (Feb. 14, 1992).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.

83 411 U.S. 546 (1973).
84 Id. at 550.
85 Id at 551.
86 Id. at 559 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, the only
buyer for the mutual fund shares "once issued" was the issuing company itself.
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interpreted in such a manner."87 Likewise, it is hard to imagine that
Congress intended an interpretation of fair market value for estate tax
purposes that requires an honest taxpayer to use an illicit market, when
by enacting BGEPA, Congress allowed for the continued possession of
pre-enactment bald eagles but prohibited all sales. It is one thing to
imagine a hypothetical market and another to require a hypothetical
illicit market. And yet, when faced with an honest taxpayer and a forhim illicit market, one court seemed to force the taxpayer's use of the
market.
In Robson v. Commissioner, the Tax Court had to determine the
fair market value of various wild game animal trophy mounts for
charitable deduction purposes.8 8 Taxpayers were accomplished hunters,
who made hunting trips to various locations around the world. They
displayed their trophy mounts in their California homes, and from 1990
to 1993, they donated several of these mounts to charitable
organizations, for which they claimed charitable deductions on their
income tax retums.89 Under California state law at the time, it was
illegal to sell these mounts. 90 The taxpayers consequently argued that
because they as California residents could not legally sell in California
or in another state,9 ' the proper method of valuation was replacement
cost, 92 not evidence of value through comparable sales. The court noted
replacement cost is generally used where "the property is unique, the
market is limited, and there is no evidence of comparable sales." 93 That
was not the case here. The court found that while it was illegal to sell in
California, neighboring Western states had "relatively few sales
restrictions." 94 Because "an active market exists throughout the United
States for substantially comparable items," 95 as a practical matter, the
California restrictions did not "materially affect the value" 96 of the
donated items. In essence, California's prohibition on sales was an
irrelevancy for the legitimate national market.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed noting the fair market value
test is objective, and there is no requirement that "taxpayers themselves
actually be able to sell the" property. 97 Citing precedent, the court
observed that under the fair market value test, one is "to assume the
existence of a willing buyer and a willing seller, regardless of whether
87 Id. at 557.

88Robson v. C.I.R., 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2574 (1997), aff'd, 172 F.3d 876, at 1 (9th Cir. 1999).
89 Id. at 1.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 2.

92Replacement cost here is essentially the taxpayers' cost to travel on their hunting trips plus
their taxidermy costs.
93Supra note 88, at 3 (quoting Estate of Palmer v. Comm'r, 839 F.2d 420, 424 (8th Cir. 1988)).
94 Id. at 1.
95Id. at 3.
96 Id.
97 Robson v. Commn'r, 172 F. 3d 876, at 1 (9th Cir. 1999).
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they actually existed or not, and to assume that the property could and
would change hands, even though such a change could not in fact
occur."9 8 Robson confirms the hypothetical nature of the willing buyer
- willing seller test, and concludes that the use of comparables from the
"active market ... throughout the United States" was appropriate in the
context of the charitable deduction. 99
There are three aspects of Robson that distinguish it from Canyon.
First, the issue in Robson was the method of valuation (replacement cost
or comparable sales) and not the relevant market. Second, to the extent
that a market was implicated in the choice of method, the market for
comparables used by the court was an "active market .. . throughout the
United States." That market was by and large a legitimate one; and in
the actual California market, there was no impact on price because of
California's sales prohibition. It was an irrelevancy. Third, in choosing
a national market for comparables, the court may have been "taking into
account the location of the item." 00 That national market was an open
market for a United States resident, with no state border controls.' 0 ' In
Robson, animal mounts were legally saleable in that national market,
just not by Californians. It is the status of the seller, a California
resident, that determined the legality of the transaction. By contrast,
Canyon cannot be bought or sold legally anywhere in the United States
by anyone, and it cannot leave this country or be exported for sale. In
this context, "taking into account" Canyon's location suggests either
using a national art market that does not allow a sale or using an
international art market that Canyon can not physically enter. Neither
market is suitable.
Fair market value is the standard for estate tax valuation; as a
standard, its application depends on the particular facts before it.
Whenever facts are extreme, a blind or rigid application of the standard
may harm the system more than support it.102 As the Court noted in
98Id. at 1 (quoting Bank of California v. Comm'r, 133 F. 2d 428 (9th Cir. 1943). At issue in that
case was the estate tax valuation of a claim for refund of income taxes).
99 Supra note 95.
100Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (2012).
101It is important to note that an interstate sale in violation of California law was itself a federal

offense. See Robson, 73 T.C.M. at 2.

102See, e.g., Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA. TAX REv. 295
(2011). Professors Abreu and Greenstein argue that in the context of the income tax, judicial and
administrative deviations from the widely-accepted definition of income cannot be attributed to
lawlessness or ignorance. Rather, they posit that "economics is not everything" and that noneconomic values, such as administrability, including popular or social opinion, may provide an
apt interpretation of the meaning of income. A recent example of an apt interpretation was the
nontaxability of catching Mark McGwire's record setting homerun baseball. Most tax scholars
and tax attorneys viewed the newly caught ball as an "undeniable accession[] to wealth, clearly
realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion", the standard set forth by the
Supreme Court for income in Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). The IRS
Commissioner at the relevant time was Charles Rossotti, a businessman, not a tax specialist.
When first asked about the tax implications, an IRS spokesperson said it would be taxed; "a
firestorm of controversy erupted." Abreu & Greenstein, supra. Rossotti said the fan "deserves a
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Cartwright, the Treasury Regulation that ignored the Congressionallycreated bifurcated market for mutual funds was unreasonable and
unrealistic, in contrast to the common sense approach of the taxpayer.
Robson is distinguishable because as a one-state-only prohibition
against sale, there was nevertheless an active legitimate market for
comparables in the United States. Robson was not forced into a
completely illicit market. In the absence of a strong showing of
voluntariness and regularity in the decedent's use of the illicit market,
requiring an illicit market as the relevant market is inapt. Moreover,
because no legal market exists anywhere in the United States for
Canyon, forcing an honest faxpayer into a foreign market-that might
be legal if the taxpayer could export the item-is unreasonable and
similarly inapt when one takes "into account the location of the item."
From a policy perspective, the better course is to value by using a
hypothetical market that takes into account the four interests retained by
Sonnabend.
B. The Fallacyof Zero Value

Because Canyon cannot legally be sold in the United States nor
legally exported for sale outside the United States, the estate argues the
legitimate art market-whether auction or dealer-values Canyon at
zero. That is undoubtedly true and it has a clear and direct appeal. That
argument, however, focuses solely on the sales prohibition, ignores the
value of Sonnabend's four retained interests to possess, transport,
donate, and devise, and similarly ignores the hypothetical nature of the
willing buyer-willing seller test for fair market value.
The estate tax is a tax on the transfer of the decedent's property at
death.103 When a decedent's property is subject to a restriction, the
traditional approach is to include the interest in the decedent's estate
and then to value that interest taking into account the restriction.104
Stock and real property are two types of property that commonly have
restrictions that impact value for estate tax purposes. The IRS officially
acknowledges those restrictions as a discount factor in valuation. 05
round of applause, not a big tax bill" demonstrating that "real people work[] at the IRS." Id. at
342-43.
103 I.R.C. § 2001 (2006) ("A tax is hereby imposed on the transfer of the taxable estate of every
decedent .... ). See, e.g., Estate of McClatchy v. Comm'r, 147 F.3d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 1998).
"The federal estate tax is a tax on 'the transfer of the taxable estate of [the] decedent.' Id. at
1091.
104 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-287, 1977-2 C.B. 319 (dealing with restricted securities).
1o5See, e.g., I.R.S. Business Valuation Guidelines § 2.2.1 ("in developing a valuation conclusion,
Valuators must ... determine the scope of work necessary to identifying ... Restrictions . . . that
may influence value."). And, "the Valuator should separately consider . . . the effect of relevant
contractual and legal restrictions." Id. at § 2.3.6.1.
Similarly for real estate, see I.R.S. Valuation Training for Appeals Officers Course Book,
Training 6126-002 (Rev. 05-97), Lesson 3, Real Estate ("In a typical real estate valuation, the
appraiser will consider general social, economic, governmental and environmental conditions and
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Revenue Ruling 77-287 addressed the valuation of securities
restricted from immediate resale under the federal securities law.106
While eschewing any automatic discount formula for the sales
restriction, the ruling states: "[t]he ... elements of time ... bear upon
this discount; the longer the buyer . .. must wait to liquidate those

shares, the greater the discount."l 07 McClatchy v. Commissioner shows
the importance of this type of sales restriction in an estate tax case. 108
The parties agreed that the value of the restricted stock was $12.337 a
share, while the unrestricted stock was valued at $15.56 a share, an
approximate 21% discount solely for the restriction of an immediate
sale, not a total prohibition of sale.109 On appeal, the IRS argued against
any discount because the stock in the hands of the estate (as opposed to
the decedent) was not actually subject to the sales restriction.10 This
was because of the fortuitous circumstance that McClatchy's executor,
as it turned out, was not considered an affiliated party under the
securities law.'
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and upheld
the discount, noting that the decedent's death did not, in and of itself,
extinguish the sales restriction." 2 It followed the convention that estate
tax value does not depend on the identity of a particular recipient;
instead, it is based on hypothetical buyers and hypothetical sellers. 113
The court applied the fair market value standard consistent with its
objective and hypothetical nature.
The fair market value of real property for charitable deduction
purposes was at issue in Thornton v. Commissioner."14 Taxpayers paid
$15,000 for a cemetery that was near the University of Nevada." 5 A
year later, they donated the land to the University, claiming a $503,000
charitable deduction on the theory that the highest and best use of the
land was as a multi-unit residential property, such as married student

trends, as they affect property values."). Examples of governmental restrictions include "zoning
laws, . . . deed restrictions," and environmental concerns. "An extremely important factor to
consider in 'today's world' is the impact on value of any pertinent environmental features . . .
that can . . . substantially impact the [fair market value] of properties affected by them" Id. The
Endangered Species Act is a critical environmental issue which "has, in some areas, severely
restricted use of certain properties." Id. Moreover, the lists of restrictions is not exclusive: "In
other words, anything that affects the value of the property being appraised . . . should be
considered." Id.
106 Rev. Rul. 77-287, 1977-2 C.B. 319.
107 Id.

108 Estate of McClatchy v. Comm'r, 106 T.C. 206 (1996), rev'd, 147 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 1998).
109 Id. at 208.

110 McClatchy v. Comm'r, 147 F.3d 1089, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 1998).
11, Id.

112 Id. at 1093.

113 Id. at 1094. See also Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc)
(the Fifth Circuit firmly rejected the IRS's attempt to incorporate a "family attribution" approach
to valuing assets in a decedent's estate, reasoning that it would be against the hypothetical nature
of the buyer and seller).
114 Thornton v. Comm'r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 395 (1988), affd, 908 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1990).
115 Id. at 400.
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housing." 6 One factual problem was the existence of significant legal
hurdles to get the necessary state and local permissions to develop the
property from a cemetery into multi-unit housing. In theory, the court
agreed with the taxpayers' approach:
We agree with petitioners that in determining the value of property
on a given date a potential highest and best use for the property can
be considered even though the potential use is prohibited on the
valuation date by some restriction in a deed, statute or zoning
regulation. We also agree that in such a case the proper approach is
to value the property at its highest and best use ... then to proceed to

reduce or discount such value by a reasonable estimate of the cost of
removing the restriction and for the time needed to accomplish such
removal. However, the projected highest and best use must have a
strong possibility of achievement. In other words, it should not be
remote, speculative or conjectural." 7
In considering all the facts, however, the court found that, at the
time of the donation, the potential highest and best use of the cemetery
land as housing was "too remote, too speculative and too conjectural" to
allow that potential use to determine value.118
What do these principles suggest for the valuation of Canyon?
First, that Canyon cannot be sold does not mean it has zero value for
estate tax purposes. Second, the restriction on its sale must be
considered in valuing the property for estate tax purposes. Third, the
valuation approach should value Canyon without the restrictions
imposed by BGEPA and should then proceed to consider a discount to
that value because of those regulatory restrictions." 9 It is that last step,
of course, that bears the weight of the conflict. It is at this point that a
hypothetical market comes into play. What is the market value of being
Canyon's owner if the only ownership rights are to possess, transport,
devise or donate in the United States? Faced with this less-than-robust
ownership, a hypothetical willing buyer and willing seller might
consider the possibility of two future-oriented actions: lobbying to
overturn BGEPA (or more narrowly its application to Canyon) or a
donation to charity. If the possibility of moving a cemetery was to be
ignored, then certainly the possibility of changing a federal law that
protects the nation's symbolic bald eagle is equally "remote, speculative
or conjectural." The possibility of a charitable donation is a different
matter. Donating a work of art to an art museum can qualify for a
116Id. at 402 (citations omitted).
117Id. at 404.
118Id.

119Instead of using the subtractive approach, one could probably also use an accretive method,
i.e., value the four retained interests directly. The subtractive approach is the more usual
valuation method, and because of that familiarity, it is the one I recommend.

2012]

VALUING ART IN AN ESTATE

63

charitable deduction for income tax purposes of fair market value for
the donor.120 This charitable donation possibility may be another factor
lurking behind the IRS valuation of $65 million. 12 1 The concern would
be the possible whipsaw effect to the federal fisc, that is, the taxpayers
would value Canyon at zero for estate tax purposes, but would value it,
say, at $10 million as a charitable deduction for income tax purposes.1 22
While this concern is legitimate, there are significant practical and
doctrinal limitations that would reduce the value of a charitable

donation.123
Beyond the possibilities of a law change or charitable donation, the
rights to possess during life and devise at death also have value to many
people; one needs only to think of family heirlooms as an example. A
troubling aspect of Canyon, however, is the reported insistence of FWS
that Canyon must be on display at a public museum. 124 If that is the
case, it raises another question on the meaning of "possess" under
BGEPA, as explicated by Andrus. The Court noted that there was "no
physical invasion or restraint" on the artifacts because of the regulation,
and deemed it "crucial" that the defendants retained the rights to
possess, transport, devise and donate.125 If Canyon's owners do not in
fact have the right to exclusive possession, another discount to its value
should be taken, one that could be as significant as the discount for the
sales prohibition. Of the four rights deemed retained under the Andrus
analysis, it may be that only the right to devise is free of regulatory
interference from BGEPA.

120 I.R.C. § 170 (2006).
121 See, e.g., Joseph Bothwell, Comment to Novack, supra note 1.

122 It is beyond the scope of this article to consider all the issues that a charitable donation of
Canyon could involve.
123 One practical limitation is the quantitative cap on the amount of a charitable deduction a
taxpayer may claim in any particular year, with the excess being a carry forward for up to five
years. See I.R.C. § 170(b),(d). Lerner, the estate's attorney, estimated it would take his clients
seventy-five years to fully use the charitable deduction, quipping, "my clients would have to live
to 140 or so." Cohen, supra note 1.
One doctrinal limitation may be the principle of consistency, under which courts will
sometimes deny a taxpayer's current tax position because it is inconsistent with a position
previously taken by the taxpayer. For example, in Janis v. Comm'r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1322
(2004), aff'd, 461 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2006) and 469 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2006), two brothers
inherited an art gallery upon their father's death. They valued the works of art and claimed a
blockage discount for estate tax purposes. When they sold various works of art after their father's
death, they reported their gain on their income tax returns using the undiscounted values. The
Tax Court held that the discounted values were to be used for income tax purposes because of the
tax principle of consistency.
124 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 1 ("Mrs. Sonnabend was then able to retain ownership as long as
the work continued to be exhibited at a public museum.").
125 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979); see supra notes 44-52.
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III. CONSIDERATION OF PROCESS INART VALUATION

A. Overview
If a tax return that has been selected for audit includes an appraisal
for a single work of art valued at $50,000 or more, the case must be sent
to the Art Appraisal Services (AAS) unit of the IRS Office of
Appeals.126 AAS will independently review the appraisal and refer the
case to the Art Advisory Panel (the "Panel") when applicable.127
Created in 1968, the Panel is a volunteer board of about twentyfive art dealers, scholars and curators.1 28 Their charge is to assist the
IRS in reviewing and evaluating taxpayer submitted art appraisals on a
work's fair market value. There are two subcommittees, one for Fine
Arts and one for Decorative Arts.129 Before each meeting, the AAS will
send the panelists photographs of the art works and written materials
concerning the work's size, medium, physical condition and
provenance, and sales data on relevant art work. 130 No indication of the
taxpayer's or appraiser's identity or the tax consequences of any
adjustment is provided. The panelists review the material, and panelists
do "our own research," and "bring notes" on the objects to the
meeting. 131

The closed-door meetings are held generally in Washington once
or twice a year as needed. Objects are presented alphabetically by artist.
Discussions are "lively, but serious" 32 without "hostilities, but there are
differences of opinion," 33 with the Panel's goal being to reach a
consensus on value. If the Panel rejects the taxpayer's valuation, it
126Art Appraisal Services Overview, IRM 4.48.2.1 (Dec. 14, 2010); see also Art Appraisal
Services Assistance, IRM 8.18.1.3 (Dec. 14, 2010). Prior to 2011, the monetary threshold was
$20,000. Art Advisory Panel, Annual Summary Report for 2010, 2 (2010), http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-utl/annrep2010.pdf [hereinafter "Summary Report for 2010"].
127IRM 4.48.2.1.

128For an explanation of the Art Advisory Panel's origins set within the context of creating a
similar panel for valuing conservation easements, see Nancy A. McLaughlin, Increasingthe Tax
Incentives for ConservationEasementDonations-A Responsible Approach, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1,

87-91 (2004).
The number of panelists has varied over the years. In 2009, there were twenty-one nonIRS panelists; in 2010 and 2011 , there were nineteen. See Art Advisory Panel, Annual Summary
Report for 2009, (2009), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/annrep2009.pdf [hereinafter "Summary
Report for 2009"]; Summary Report for 2010, supra note 126; Art Advisory Panel, Annual
Summary Report for 2011, (2011), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/annrep20l l.pdf [hereinafter
"Summary Report for 2011"].
129See Summary Report for 2011, supra note 128, at 3.
130Id. at 2.
131Judith Dobrzynski, Taxing Matters: The Powers Behind the IRS Art Advisory Panel, ART +

AUCTION, Aug. 15 2008, http://www.judithdobrzynski.com/4641/taxing-matters (describing the
art valuation review process from the panelists perspective). The Panel's knowledge of private
sales based on their personal experiences and from information gleaned "from other members of
their relatively small industry" provides essential information not readily available to the AAS.
Summary Report for 2011, supra note 128, at 2.
132Summary Report for 2011, supra note 128, at 2.
133 Dobrzynski, supra note 131.
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makes a recommendation as to value. That recommendation is advisory
and becomes the IRS position "only with AAS concurrence." 1 34 An
AAS written report with supporting evidence is provided to the
requesting IRS office and the taxpayer.
Undoubtedly, the volunteer Panel has provided cost-effective
expertise for decades to the AAS in "the potentially high abuse area of
art valuation";135 but in a unique, high-profile case like Sonnabend's
Canyon, fault lines in the art valuation protocol become more visible.
There are four interrelated issues that cause concern: market expertise,
objectivity, comparables, and the evidentiary use of Panel notes. The
first three issues implicate the appraisal norms of competency and
conflicts, and the last, procedural fairness.
B. Concerns on Valuation Protocol

1. Market Expertise
The sole inquiry before the Panel is the fair market value of a
particular work of art on a particular day. The emphasis is on fair
market value (what a willing buyer would pay, and a willing seller
would accept, for the sale of the property) and not artistic value. The
Panel is composed of "art experts"; but not all art experts are art market
experts. Moreover, panelists with art market expertise may not have the
relevant specialized art market expertise. These are two distinctions
that courts find relevant in determining the weight to be given an
expert's opinion.
Courts routinely evaluate an expert on his or her art market
expertise-the depth of experience and knowledge in the public auction
market, as well as in the private dealer market. For a work like Canyon,
both markets would be possible sales venues, and therefore, both
markets should be explored. One practical issue on valuation is how to
document or verify sales data for auctions, as well as for private sales.
If an art expert has no direct experience in buying or selling art, then
public auction records become the resource by default. In Biagiotti v.
Commissioner, for example, the Tax Court found the taxpayer's expert
"most reliable" because as a dealer in pre-Columbian art "his sales and
pricing experience" was far greater than the other experts whose
experience was generally academically-based.136 On the other hand,
134 Art Advisory Panel, IRM 4.48.2.1.1 (Dec. 20, 2010). There has apparently been some internal
confusion as to the weight of authority accorded the Panel's recommendations. Cf e.g.,
Summary Report for 2010, supra note 126, at 3 ("The determinations of the Art Advisory Panel
became the position of the Internal Revenue Service") with Summary Report for 2011, supra note
128, at 3 ("The Panel's Recommendations are advisory.").
135See Summary Report for 2011, supra note 128, at 2.

13652 T.C.M. (CCH) 588 (1986). See also Williford v. Comm'r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 422, at 10,
(the court determined one expert was the "least persuasive" expert because he relied exclusively
on auction data, noting "[h]is reluctance to rely on private sales appeared primarily to be a result
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including private sales data is not necessarily determinative. In Mitchell
v. Commissioner,137 the court adopted the appraisal report prepared by
the taxpayer's expert because it was based on exhaustively researched
public sales. In contrast, the appraisal prepared by the IRS's expert had
incorporated some private sales. That would generally be perceived as
a fuller appraisal,138 but given that those sales were not documented or
verifiable, the expert admitted at trial he did not put "great weight" on
those undocumented private sales. 139 Neither did the court.
In some situations, the expert may have art market expertise, but
not expertise in the particular specialized area of the art market.
Mitchell 40 is again a good example. The issue was the valuation of two
American Western oil paintings, Casuals on the Range by Frederic
Remington and Creasedby Charles Russell. Both artists are recognized
masters of American Western Art. There were three appraisals before
the court in addition to the Panel's appraisal.141 At trial, the estate's
expert valued the Remington at $1.2 million and the Russell at
$750,000.142 The IRS trial expert valued the works significantly higher,
at $2.2 million and $1.8 million respectively, while the IRS examination
expert determined the highest values, being $2.3 million and $2 million
respectively.143 In contrast to these definite values, the Panel
determined a range of values being $600,000 to $850,000 for the
Remington and $300,000 to $1 million for the Russell.144 What is
particularly pertinent here is that the IRS examination expert, who was
the staff appraiser assigned to the case, rejected the Panel's valuations
because of the "disparate and wide-ranging valuations" which the expert
attributed to the Panel's "inexperience in American Western art." 45
With a note of irony, the court stated that the taxpayer's expert was the
only expert with American Western art experience.146 The court, of
course, carefully reviewed all the experts' appraisals and their
credentials and, in doing so, found that the appraisals prepared by the

of his lack of familiarity with those sales.").
137101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1435 (2011).
138See, e.g., Williford, 64 T.C.M. at 9 ("The parties agreed that only auction sales and private
sales which are documentable or verifiable should be considered in valuing [the] paintings.").
139Mitchell, 101 T.C.M. at 13. The expert "failed to provide the exact sale prices, exact sale
dates, identities of buyers or sellers, information on the condition of the paintings or discussions
on provenance." Id.
140 Id
141Id
142Id. at 12.
143 Id. at 13-14.
144 Id. at 13.
14S Id

146
Id. at 14. The IRS examination expert "expressed suspicions about the Art Panel report
because the panelists were not experts in American Western art. If this were the only criterion,
then the Court would only rely upon [taxpayer's expert] as no trial or examination expert for
respondent has expertise in valuing American Western art." Id.
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taxpayer's expert were "the most reasonable and well-supported," 47
and the "better indicator of value." 48
The Panel is composed of art experts who assuredly have an
"extraordinarily high degree of expertise."l 49 Cases suggest, however,
that with respect to any particular item under examination, the art
experts may not have the requisite art market expertise or may not have
expertise in the particular area of art that is under consideration.
Applying this perspective, the Panel's specific art market expertise-as
opposed to its general art expertise-may not be as deep as many
believe. 50
2. Objectivity
To ensure the objectivity of the Panel, no taxpayer identifying
details are included when the AAS sends information to the panelists.' 5 '
Courts recognize the importance of competency and objectivity by
referencing the Panel's expertise as well as its neutrality. Consequently,
Panel valuations are seen as "extremely credible" and "unbiased." 152
Into this perspective, an acknowledgement of reality must be injected.
By sending materials in advance for the panelists to consider, it
should be assumed that independent research will be done, at the very
least, by those panelists whose expertise encompasses the work under
review, and probably as well by those panelists outside the particular
field.153
With Canyon, research would quickly yield Ileana
Sonnabend's name as the owner, and with Sonnabend's name, research
would just as quickly reveal news of her death. In truth (and aside from
the obvious tax inference of zero value), research for these two details
may be unnecessary for many of the panelists. Almost all of the nonmuseum members of the 2009 Panel 54 were from New York, where
Ileana Sonnabend was a legend in the art world and in the art market for
147 Id. at 15.
148 Id. at 14.

149 Art Appraisal Services Coordination, IRM 8.18.1.3.3 (Dec. 14, 2010).
Iso In this regard, it is interesting to note the IRS statement: "[t]he panelists' knowledge is
particularly beneficial in the authentication of works of art." Summary Report for 2011, supra
note 128, at 2.
151 See, e.g., id

152 Stone v. United States, No. C06-0259 TEH, 2007 WL 1544786, at *2 (N.D. Ca. May 25,
2007), af'd No. 07-17068, 2009 WL 766497 (9th Cir. 2009).
153 See, e.g., Summary Report for 2011, supra note 128, at 2 ("During their meetings, the
panelists review the information provided, along with the research and findings of both the
Panelists and staff appraisers.").
154 Of the twenty-one panelists for the 2009 Art Advisory Panel, nine had museum or scholarly
affiliations. Of the twelve non-museum members, only one was listed as not being from New
York; and he was from Philadelphia. See Summary Report for 2009, supra note 128, at 8-9. The
Panel's Summary Report for 2009 is the only Sonnabend post-death report that has a Panel
adjustment to estate tax values sufficient to include a $65 million upward adjustment. Id. at 6.
In that report, the aggregate taxpayer claim for the 309 works which were adjusted upward for
estate and gift tax purposes was $135,278,012. Id. The Panel's aggregate valuation was
$225,055,370, an increase of $89,777,358 or sixty-six percent. Id.
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decades. Moreover, some of the museum members, although more
geographically dispersed, would also likely be familiar with Canyon,
Sonnabend, or both.155 In short, one cannot be an art expert and
simultaneously not know about significant works of art or their owners,
especially if one does research. From this angle, the IRS statement on
its steps to ensure objectivity and taxpayer privacy, while allowing for
research, is internally flawed, and all the more so, for a high-profile case
like Canyon.

In all appraisal work, objectivity of the appraiser is a basic and
important norm; and in reviewing appraisals involved in tax returns,
taxpayer privacy is required. There can be slippage in the Panel's
achieving these two aims that may not be fully appreciated or
recognized by the IRS, courts and taxpayers. The steps taken to ensure
objectivity and taxpayer privacy are important; however, they are not
one hundred percent effective.
3. Comparables
There are multiple approaches to valuation, but for most works of
art, an appraisal based on sales of comparable works is common. 156
When an artist has a history of documented sales, that is generally the
most relevant valuation information.' 57 Yet, references to sales by other
artists can be useful for market trends or in cases where sales by the
pertinent artist are thin. Choosing the comparable works and deciding
whether to use other artists' sales are basic decisions in the valuation
process. Courts will listen to the parties' explanations on the relevance
of any particular comparable used in the appraisal process.
For artists whose works sell at auction, public auction data is the
most commonly used sales data for the simple reasons of availability
and reliability. 58 Use of private sales data is also considered if the sales
155E.g., Stephanie Barron, a member of the Panel, is the senior curator at the Los Angeles

County Museum of Art, which held a Rauschenberg exhibition in 2006.
156See, e.g., Williford v. Comm'r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 422 at 10 ("Generally, comparable sales of
similar properties that are reasonably proximate in time represent the best evidence of fair market
value."). This approach was reportedly echoed by panelist Stephanie Barron: "[w]hen you come
up with a valuation you look at comparable works and what they have sold for at public or private
sales." Cohen, supra note 1.
157The Internal Revenue Manual lends credibility to this in listing "sales and analysis of similar
works by the artist" as an information item to be included in an internal IRS request for valuation
assistance from AAS. See Information Needed for Art Valuation Requests, IRM 4.48.2.3.1 (Dec.
14,2010).
158Yet not all auction prices can be believed. In Cristallina S.A. v. Christie, Manson & Woods
Int'l Inc., 502 N.Y.S.2d 165, 170 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986), Christie's issued a formal press release
advising that three works of art had been sold, when only one had actually been sold. The
"explanation for this deception [was] that it was for 'the benefit of [the plaintiff] and the art
market."' Id. at 170. Christie's was fined $80,000 by the New York Department of Consumer
Affairs, and tighter auction regulations were put in place. Id. at 173. See Patty Gerstenblith,
Picture Imperfect: Attempted Regulation of the Art Market, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 501 (1988).

The new Chinese art auction market may also have compromised auction price data, for example,
the practice of reporting winning bids as sold even though the ostensibly successful bidder did not
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information is documented and verifiable. 159 Rauschenberg's high
auction price before Sonnabend's death was $10.6 million in May 2007
for Photograph from the 1959 combines. 160 That auction record was
broken a year later on May 14, 2008, when Rauschenberg's cityscape
Overdrive sold for $14.6 million.161 With an auction record of $10.6
million pre-death and $14.6 million seven months after death, it is
logical to question a $65 million valuation as of death. Two aspects of
comparables valuation could provide explanations-private sales and
other artists' sales. Each, however, comes with a significant caveat for
art valuations in general and for Canyon in particular.
Private sales of significant art often make the news. Rauschenberg
was no exception. In 2005, it was reported that MOMA had finally
acquired Rebus, a Rauschenberg combine painting from 1955 that
MOMA had tried to purchase in the 1960s.162 The work, the identity of
the buyer and seller, the approximate sales date, and the provenance are
stated in the news reports; the sales price is not. The "price is believed
to be about $30 million."' 63 The use of qualifiers undermines the
piece's documented and verifiable status for comparables purposes and
would therefore be rejected as a comparable.1 64 But if a panelist has
information on the comparable's transaction, would that make the
private sale documented or verifiable?

pay. More sinister is the concern that government involvement in auction house control has led
to practices that inflate reported auction data for political purposes. See Abigail R. Esman,
China's $13 Billion Art Fraud-And What It Means for You, FORBES, Aug. 13, 2012,

http://www.forbes.com/sites/abigailesman/2012/08/13/chinas-13-billion-art.
159Willford, 64 T.C.M. at 9 ("The parties agree that only auction sales and private sales which
are documentable or verifiable should be considered in valuing paintings.").

160Rothko Painting Sells for Record US$72.8m, HONG KONG STANDARD, May 17, 2007,

http://www.thestandard.com.hk/newsdetail.asp?we-cat=6&art-id=44599&sid=13643858&con_
type=1 &dstr-20070517&fc=7.

161Kelly Crow, Dramaand Delight at Sotheby's $362 Million Sale, WSJ BLOGS (May 15, 2008,

12:24 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ontheblock/2008/05/15/drama-and-delight-at-sothebys-362million-sale ("Another dramatic moment came mid-way through the sale when only two bidders
went after Robert Rauschenberg's cheerful cityscape, 'Overdrive.' A telephone bidder won it for
$14.6 million, still a record . . . ."). Rauschenberg died on May 12, 2008, just two days before the
Sotheby's auction. Id. Some expressed concerns about his death's impact on the three
Rauschenbergs that were up for auction.

See Kelly Crow, Rauschenberg's Death Could Affect

Auction of Works by Sotheby's, WSJ BLOGS, (May 13, 2008, 4:01 PM), http://blogs.
wsj.com/ontheblock/2008/05/13/rauschenbergs-death-could-affect-auction-of-works-bysothebys/.
162Carol Vogel, The Modern Buys 'Rebus', N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com

/2005/06/17/arts/design/I 7voge.

163Id. See also Calvin Tomkins, Everything in Sight, NEW YORKER, May 23, 2005, http://www.

newyorker.com/archive/2005/05/23/050523fafact-tomkins (Indicating that "the purchase price
is said to be as much as thirty million dollars."); Emmanuelle Soichet, MoMA Acquires Rebus, A
Key Early Work by Rauschenberg, ARTINFO, (Jan. 23, 2007), http://www.artinfo.com/news/story/
560/moma-acquires-rebus-a-key-early-work-by-rauschenberg (Indicating that the work was
acquired "for an undisclosed amount most likely around $30 million."),
164See supra text accompanying note 139. In addition, one needs to consider the reliability of
reports of a private sale at a certain price. Dealers have also been known to inflate sales prices.
See RICHARD POLSKY, I SOLD ANDY WARHOL. (Too SOON) (2009) for an entertaining insider's

look at the art market.

70

CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT

[Vol. 31:45

The Panel's protocol requires a panelist to recuse herself "[i]n the
event of a conflict of interest involving a Panelist and a work of art
under review."165 Three conflicts scenarios come to mind. The clearest
application involves a panelist who herself was involved in the sale of
the work under review to the taxpayer. In this case, recusal is required
for obvious reasons. A second conflicts scenario occurs when a panelist
is involved in a private and confidential sale of a comparable work of
art. The third conflicts scenario involves the trusted source scenario,
meaning a panelist was not involved in a private sale of the work or a
comparable work, but has information from a trusted source who was so
involved. Recusal may not be required by the Panel's conflicts protocol
for the latter two scenarios, yet use of undocumented and non-verifiable
sales information in the Panel's valuation, to any extent, is
problematic. 166
The second possible explanation for the $65 million valuation is
using sales data from another artist for comparables. Andy Warhol is
mentioned as a possibility. 167 At the time of Sonnabend's death,
Warhol's then auction record was $71.7 million for Green Car Crash in
May 2007.168 Is it appropriate to use Warhol? Rauschenberg did
influence Warhol; however, Warhol has far eclipsed Rauschenberg at
auction, as well as virtually all twentieth century artists. 169 The choice
of Warhol, clearly and unquestionably one of the top twentieth century
artists selling at auction, as a comparable for Robert Rauschenberg or
virtually any other twentieth century artist is inappropriate and not
defensible. Warhol is truly in a class by himself for auction sales.
Moreover, because Rauschenberg has a documented sales history, using
another artist for comparable sales purposes-as opposed to showing
trends in the market-is unnecessary, and therefore, equally
inappropriate.170
Finally, there is another consideration that might help explain the
165Summary Report from 2011, supra note 128, at 2.
166If a panelist merely mentions a rumored price, it is hard, but not impossible, to unring the bell
when considering a work's value.
167Ralph Lerner, the estate's attorney, is quoted as saying of the Panel's valuation: "[t]he
valuation is based on the price made by Andy Warhol's 'Car Crash'-$71.7 m . . ." Georgina
Adam, The Art Market: In a Flap Over an Eagle, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2012, http://

www.ft.com/cms/s/2/4dblc8fe-678a-llel-b6al-00144feabdcO.html#axzz26TTpPyGT.
168Id.

169See Kelly Crow, Bets in 'll: Pop, Calder, Chinese Coins, WALL STREET J., Jan. 8, 2011,

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704415104576065961534171834.html
("This
season, expect collectors to spend heavily on art made since 1950, a primary-colored pantheon of
Pop, abstract and contemporary artists led by Andy Warhol. Last year, 1,256 Warhols sold at
auction for a combined $367 million, up from 983 of his works for $125 million a year earlier ...
. (Only Pablo Picasso pops up more often at auction these days.)"); see also Sarah Thornton, The
Wizards of the Warhol Market, ECONOMIST.COM, May 17, 2011, http:www.economist.com/
blogs/prospero/2011/05/contemporary_artsales/ for a discussion of the auction market process
involving the skewing effects of irrevocable bids and the thin but passionate group of dealers and
collectors who support the market.
170See supra note 157.
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Panel's $65 million valuation for Canyon. The Panel could simply have
rejected the comparables approach altogether. Instead of using
comparables as the valuation method, an appraiser might instead use the
"appraiser's own judgment."l 71 Faced with the taxpayer's assertion of
$0, a panelist said the Panel "just cringed at the idea of saying that
[Canyon] had zero value." 72 Consequently the Panel may have used its
own aesthetic judgment and valued Canyon "solely on its artistic value,
without reference to any accompanying restrictions or laws." 73 As the
standard is fair market value, not artistic value, and because restrictions
are part of a normal approach to market value, this approach must be
categorically rejected.174
4. Discoverability of Panel's Notes
A taxpayer bears the burden of proof for fair market value;
therefore, the taxpayer needs to establish the correctness of the
taxpayer's art valuation and the incorrectness of the IRS's valuation. A
requesting taxpayer is entitled to a written statement providing the basis
for an IRS determination of value for estate, gift or generation skipping

171Williford v. Comm'r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 422, at 9 (1992).
172Cohen, supra note 1.
173Id. See also Felix Salmon, When Museum Curators Confuse Price and Value, REUTERS, July

22, 2013, http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2012/07/23/when-museum-curators-confuseprice-and-value (quoting Panel member Stephanie Barron).
This valuation approach is similarly indefensible, as well as standing in contrast to the
market valuation norm that limitations and restrictions are to be considered when valuing
property for fair market value. An interesting practical question is whether the sales restriction
was actually in front of the Panel. Canyon is a novel situation for art valuation precisely because
it has a clear sales prohibition. Sales restrictions are not the norm in art ownership. Going
forward, restrictions on art ownership may be more common. See, e.g., Visual Artists Rights Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990), that grants visual artists certain ongoing
nonpecuniary rights to the integrity of their artistic creations even after the works have been sold.
Compare Mass. Museum of Contemp. Art Found., Inc. v. Bichel, 593 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2010)
with Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011) for two judicial interpretations as to
VARA's scope and breadth. In addition, newer art market norms as to proving provenance
(though not legal restrictions) can also impact value. But cf Ralph Blumenthal, The Curse ofthe
Outcast

Artifact,

N.Y.

TIMES,

July

12,

2012,

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/arts/design/antiquity-market-grapples-with-stricterguidelines-for-gifts.html?n=Top%2fReference%2fTimes%20Topics%
2fSubjects%2fA%2fAntiques (the depressant impact on auction value of antiquities when the
owner cannot prove that the antiquity entered the U.S. before 1970, or perhaps 1983).
174See Salmon, supra note 173:

The assumptions baked in to this are both jaw-dropping and entirely unsurprising at
the same time. Barron is the senior curator of 20th-century art at Lacma, which puts
her at the pinnacle of the non-profit art world, the place where art is supposedly valued
just for its own sake and not because it's worth lots of money. And yet, faced with a
literally priceless work of art, Barron and her fellow panelists "just cringed" at
ratifying precisely that concept....
For Stephanie Barron, a work's financial value is defined by its artistic value. But for
people like Robert Rauschenberg and Ileana Sonnabend, that was never the case. They
both died wealthy, thanks to the art world. But I think they would have been genuinely
horrified at Barron's idea-the concept that if Canyon is worth nothing financially,
then it must be worth nothing aesthetically. It's a dangerous and invidious notion ....
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tax purposes. 75 Given the concerns expressed on market expertise,
objectivity, and comparables, a taxpayer's access to notes and other
documentation that the IRS and Panel considered in reaching their
valuations can be very important. In Bernardo v. Commissioner,176 the
Tax Court ordered the IRS to produce the Panel's notes regarding its
valuation of the taxpayer's art. It rejected the IRS's claim of executive
privilege, noting that the Panel's meetings are closed because of the
statutory requirement on preserving confidentiality of taxpayer's tax
returns, "and not to insure the candor of intragovernmental
communications."l 77
More than a decade later, in Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United

States, 78 a judge similarly rejected the IRS assertion of the deliberate
process privilege. The court also summarily rejected IRS's assertion
that Panel members valued the secrecy of the process and would not
otherwise serve on the Panel, by wondering "why Panel members
assume the proceedings are secret when the Tax Court ruled 14 years
ago" they were not.179 The P & G court similarly ordered the
production of the Panel's notes to the requesting taxpayer.180 In
essence, the two lower courts have determined the Panel's meetings
may be behind closed doors, but they are not secret from the taxpayers
whose art is being valued.
It is apparent that the Panel's notes may be a useful source of
information for the taxpayer who is required to show the inaccuracy of
the Panel's valuation. The reluctance of the IRS to produce Panel notes
is troubling because it raises concerns regarding accountability and
transparency of process, critical elements for citizens and good
government.
The foregoing discussion on market expertise, objectivity,
comparables, and Panel notes raises concerns on the IRS's valuation
protocol. An acknowledgement of the practical realities underlying IRS
art valuations is not cause to scrap the IRS art valuation protocol. It
does suggest that any approach that gives a thumb-on-the-scale in favor
of the Panel's valuation may not be appropriate, whether or not it is
articulated. Mostly, it is a reminder that not all art valuation cases can
be reviewed completely objectively, and that a review of the art
valuation protocol may be overdue.A recent governmental report has
raised an analogous concern.

175 I.R.C.

§ 7517 (2006).

176104 T.C. 677 (1995).
177Id at 694.

178No. 1:08-CV-608, 2009 WL 5219726 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 31, 2009).
179Id. at *4.
180Id
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C. GAO Recommendationsfor AAS

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has recently raised
organizational concerns over AAS art valuations.' 81 Valuation abuses
and misstatements by taxpayers have long plagued the tax system, and
Congress has addressed valuation abuses periodically. 182 In 2006,
Congress adopted section 6695A, a new civil penalty for appraisers
whose appraisals result in substantial or gross valuation misstatements
for tax purposes.183 In response to a Congressional request to review
IRS enforcement efforts with respect to appraisals, the GAO issued a
report in June 2012. One aspect of that report was an assessment of IRS
procedures for ensuring that its own appraisal experts are qualified. The
IRS employs appraisal experts in two areas--engineering and art. GAO
deemed engineering fully compliant, while GAO found AAS to be fully
compliant only with respect to the hiring standard but not with respect
to the training and quality control standards.184 This creates a "risk that
staff may not be performing quality work."' 85
AAS is part of the Office of Appeals (Appeals), which requires
annual continuing education for its staff. Appraisal skills, however, are
not specifically identified as a subject for training. Even though there is
a standard of providing training relevant to specific job duties, the
"Appeals training guidance does not mention any relevant skills that
appraisers must maintain."1 86 According to the GAO, this creates the
possibility that art appraisers are not keeping up their skills and thus not
evaluating art appraisals as well as they could.18 7
A similar gap appears in AAS performance quality review.
Because AAS is housed within Appeals, but most of the AAS cases are
not Appeals cases, the Appeals case review system does not squarely
cover AAS work.s88 The GAO report notes that this lack of a groupwide summation or tracking of ad hoc reviews does not provide
"assurance that AAS staff are performing well specifically in regard to
their appraisal work." 89 "Without systematic evaluation, erosion of the
quality of AAS's work could occur unobserved."l 90 Moreover, "the
181 U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-608, APPRAISED VALUES ON TAX RETURNS:
BURDENS ON TAXPAYERS COULD BE REDUCED AND SELECTED PRACTICES IMPROVED (2012)

[hereinafter "GAO APPRAISED VALUES ON TAX RETURNS"].

182 See, e.g., Weil v. Comm'r, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 388 (1967); Vander
T.C.M. (CCH) 1394 (1977); and Rose v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 386 (1987) (a
three decades that involve charitable deductions for donated art and
donations morphed into sophisticated tax shelters involving lawyer-drafted
business models).
183 I.R.C. § 6695A (2006).
184 GAO APPRAISED VALUES ON TAX RETURNS, supra note 181, at 16.
185 Id.

186 Id. at 17.
187 Id.

188 Id.

189 Id. at 19
190 Id.

Hook v. Comm'r, 36
trio of cases spanning
demonstrate how art
and appraiser-friendly
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quality of potentially high-value appraisal cases involving art [are] at
risk" by these internal lapses in training and evaluation.191
These gaps in training and evaluation may be due to AAS's
specialized and unique organizational status within Appeals. Without
an organizational structure that mandates pertinent training
requirements and ongoing system-wide evaluations, it is likely that
AAS has developed a degree of organizational autonomy. That
autonomy in conjunction with highly specialized work done behind
closed doors can undermine accountability and transparency.1 92 GAO's
critique of AAS in conjunction with its concrete and realistic
recommendations is a positive development for AAS and for taxpayers.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Canyon is a unique work of American art, and it presents a unique
tax valuation situation. That uniqueness provides an opportunity to
reconsider and clarify the process for art valuations going forward.
More specifically, the following three recommendations should be
considered in clarifying the process for art valuations for tax purposes.
First, the use of an illicit market, hypothetical or otherwise, as the
relevant market for fair market value in estate tax cases should be
rejected, unless the decedent was an active participant in the market.
Good governance does not require honest citizens to break the law,
hypothetically or otherwise.
Second, because the inclusion of property in a decedent's estate is
to "the extent of the interest," whenever the ownership of property is
subject to a valid and enforceable governmental restriction at the time of
death,193 specific appraisal rules in the Internal Revenue Manual must
191Id. at 20. These training and evaluation concerns were behind the only recommendations
made by GAO to the Commissioner. Id. The first is to implement a more comprehensive quality
review system for AAS, and the second is to develop more specific and documented appraisal
training requirements for AAS. Id. The IRS agreed with the GAO recommendations. Id.
192See e.g., Paul F. Levy, The Nut IslandEffect: When Good Teams Go Wrong, 79 HARv. Bus.
REV. 51 (2001), for a discussion of the "Nut Island Effect." This unfortunately-named destructive
organizational dynamic
begins with a homogenous, deeply committed team working in isolation that can be
physical, psychological, or both .. .. [S]enior management, preoccupied with highvisibility problems, assigns the team a vital but behind-the-scenes task. This is a
crucial feature: the team carries out its task far from the eye of the public or customers.
Allowed a great deal of autonomy, team members become adept at organizing and
managing themselves, and the unit develops a proud and distinct identity.
Id. at 52. Over time, the highly specialized team is left to look after itself, and may resent
interference from senior management. The isolation allows the team to develop its own internal
rules, without the benefit of outside practices or perspectives. See Michael Harris, The Nut Island
Effect, HEALTH SCI. REV. 5 (May 2010) (discussing two case studies from public service
organizations). Harris opines that public service organizations may be more prone to this
dynamic because the "bottom line" is not quantitative, but qualitative, in which measurement and
assessment are difficult, and therefore management relies more heavily "on trust and the
dedication of team members." Id. at 7.
193This recommendation is limited to governmental restrictions; private restrictions can be
manipulated for tax valuation purposes. See I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704.
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charge the appraisers to consider the impact of that restriction on
valuation. The approach of recognizing regulatory restrictions on stock
and real property should be specifically extended to art appraisals.
Third, the protocol for the AAS and the Panel should be
thoroughly reexamined to insure that norms of competency, objectivity
and transparency are paramount. To the extent that comparables are the
basis of the AAS and Panel's valuation determinations, AAS and the
Panel must only use comparables that are verifiable and documented. If
the artist has a time-relevant, verifiable and documented sales record,
use of other artists' sales records is to be discouraged, except perhaps
for trend purposes. Panel members should be informed that pertinent
notes from the Panel discussion are discoverable by the taxpayer, and
the IRS should develop a retention policy for such notes.
Valuations of high quality, unique works of art are vexing, and
often come with enormous valuation variances from reputable and
knowledgeable art market experts. The costs involved in preparing and
defending art valuations can be significant for the taxpayer and the IRS
alike. Paying attention to norms of competency, objectivity and
transparency will not end disputes, but may lessen the number and
range of disputes, allowing the taxpayer and IRS to turn square corners
with each other. 194

194Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., famously wrote, "[m]en must turn square corners when" dealing
with the government. Rock Island A. & L. R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).
Others would extend that, see Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 387-88 (1947)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) ("It is very well to say that those who deal with the Government should
turn square corners. But there is no reason why the square corners should constitute a one-way
street.").

